Материалы для чтения the four freedoms as part of europeanization process: conditions and effectiveness of the eu impact

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Материалы для чтения the four freedoms as part of europeanization process: conditions and effectiveness of the eu impact



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Заключение


Предпринятый анализ позволяет утверждать, что «Восточное измерение» пока является «рамочным проектом», который должен, по мере продвижения, наполняться более определёнными смыслами (в принципе, именно так «созревало» «Северное измерение»). Возвращаясь к концепции Н.Паркера – П.Йонниеми – К.Браунинга, можно предположить, что Польша находится на стадии поиска оптимальных контуров своей «стратегии маргинальности», то есть использования своего стыковочного географического положения для получения выгодных (и для себя, и для ЕС) результатов. Есть ряд факторов, которые в своей совокупности могут способствовать превращению «Восточного измерения» в инструмент, двигающий Евросоюз в сторону более гибких отношений со странами, в него не входящими. К их числу можно отнести, во-первых, транс-региональное позиционирование Польши как государства, которое имеет возможность не только синтезировать опыт Центральной, Восточной и Балтийской Европы, но и непосредственно влиять на развитие событий во всех этих регионах. Другим фактором является использование опыта Финляндии и «Северного измерения», особенно в таких сферах, как снижение уровня конфликтности во взаимоотношениях соседей (польско-литовские отношения в этом смысле имеют сходство с польско-украинскими) и конструктивное решение вопросов, связанных с безопасностью, особенно в её «мягких» (невоенных и негосударственных) формах. К примеру, не в последнюю очередь благодаря «Северному измерению» Россия фактически без ущерба для своих интересов приняла неизбежность членства трёх прибалтийских республик в НАТО. Представляется, что более интенсивный польско-финский диалог является непременным условием бесконфликтного сосуществования двух «измерений».

Но есть и обстоятельства, тормозящие превращение «Восточного измерения» в механизм интеграции и преодоления разрывов на территории «Большой Европы». Среди них следует отметить очевидное позиционирование Польши как государства с исключительно западноевропейской идентичностью, основанное на исторических аналогиях и коннотациях, что приводит к сохранению за «Западом» и «Востоком» роли оппонирующих друг другу концептов. Кроме того, Польша, как было показано выше, привносит в свою «восточную политику» гораздо больше силовых факторов, связанных с «жёсткими» представлениями о безопасности. Ещё одним фактором, снижающим потенциал «Восточного измерения», является прохладное отношение официальной Варшавы к опыту Балтийского регионостроительства в целом и отсутствие диалога с Литвой, Латвией и Эстонией по поводу общей восточноевропейской политики – в частности.



Наконец, следует отметить, что перспективы «Восточного измерения» будут определяться не только тем, какая точка зрения на этот внешнеполитический проект возобладает в Польше и как он будет воспринят Европейском Союзе (в частности, захочет ли Брюссель признать за Польшей роль основного дизайнера своей восточной политики). Многое будет зависеть и от реакции со стороны России, Украины и Белоруссии. И в Киеве, и в Москве существуют свои собственные подходы к принципам взаимоотношений с ЕС, что может превратить «Восточное измерение» в объект не только различных интерпретаций, но и столкновения разных политических интересов.
MARGINALITY OR PROVINCIALITY?

PSKOV AND IVANGOROD AT THE INTERSECTION OF RUSSIA’S TRANS-BORDER RELATIONS

Dr. Andrey Makarychev

Researcher, Danish Institute for International Studies


Abstract
My intention in this paper is to analyze the state of trans-border relationship between Russia, on the one hand, and Latvia and Estonia, on the other, seen in terms of interplay between central and non-central actors. Two basic concepts – that ones of marginality and provinciality – will be used as points of departure and also compared with each other. Each of these concepts develops its own narrative and a discursive strategy. In some instances, these narratives may smoothly complement each other; and yet in other occurrences, they conflict in a manner that fuels “a battle of the story”.

According to my hypothesis, the Pskov oblast and the town of Ivangorod may be regarded as provinces and margins simultaneously, depending on the contextual frame one employs. As parts of domestic conceptualizations, they would be better characterized as provinces, while entering the trans-national scene they may be labeled as margins. Consequently, two different stories – that ones of marginality and provinciality – may co-exist and intermingle, laying foundations for two different strategies of regional development. The balance between these two strategies is determined to a large extent by the correlation between two different ways in which the regional identity is used as a discursive concept having some political connotations. One of them is centered around exclusion, which stipulates strong accent on «othering», bordering, distancing, isolation and securitization. The second one is conducive to the logic of inclusion, with de-securitization and concomitant strategies of engaging/integrating/including Russia. Since identity discourse creates differences, exclusion and inclusion may be regarded as intrinsic parts of any social identification, yet its scale is specifically large when the issues of insecurity are at stake. This is even more so in border regions, where discourses tend to construct particular understandings of who are in and who are out and why; they operate on the basis of a self/other dichotomy, where the 'other' is an opposite conflict party, portrayed as an existential threat to the 'self'.



RUSSIA’S DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE AND HERSELF:

THE DECLINE OF THE OLD AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW?

Dr. Andrey S.Makarychev

European Department,

The Danish Institute for International Studies

Introduction


This chapter is grounded in the understanding of the self-reflexive nature of the outward-oriented discourses. Through valuing others, we usually tend to implicitly evaluate ourselves. The way one assesses its neighbours is indicative of his/her own worldviews, which expands research horizons of research on discourses that are, according to Foucault, “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak”1271.

This Foucauldian approach to the regular formation of objects through discourses, being in line with some arguments of Bakhtin and Lacan, has been already applied to the study of European identity by a number of other authors. A similar approach was tried by Pertti Joenniemi who ascertains that the US discursive division of Europe into an “old” and a “new” is basically an effort “of measuring itself” and “a re-definition of the American self”1272. Iver Neumann builds his concept of identity formation on a premise that the “others”
about whom the self tells stories and who tells stories about the self are … a constitutive part of story telling… Confirmation of stories of self cannot be given by just anybody, but only by those others whom the self recognizes and respects as being of a kind with itself. The others in this set are referred to as circles of recognition”1273.
The discursive construction of Europe in Russia is a multi-faced process that develops at different levels. Paradoxically, the least turbid is the articulation of Europe in what could be called “public narratives”, i.e. stories attached to cultural formations and grounded in mass conscience. Thus, for the ordinary Russians, the prefix “Euro” undeniably means something of a better quality, like proverbial “Evroremont” (Euro-repairs). There is an endless row of neologisms synonymous of top quality, like “Euro-windows”, “Euro-plugs”, “Euro-wallpapers”, “Euro-style” and “Euro-standard” (found literally everywhere, from hairdressers saloons to toilet paper).

Not less accentuated – and equally intuitive - is a pro-European drive visible (laudable) in the Russian variety culture. In the pop music, different artistic representations of Europe top all other geographic images. Among the most recent Russian hit leaders of 2004 were songs like “London – Paris” and some others with clearly – and positively - pronounced European connotations. “The London rain”, “train Zurich – Geneva”, “the Tower bridge”, “dreams about Palma-de-Mallorca”, “walking through Paris”, “on the way to Amsterdam”, “the plane does not take me to Paris” – these are just a few of the most popular and widely known musical examples of representations of Europe in the Russian scene, along with those featuring Baden-Baden, Nice – Cannes, Riga - Moscow and other cities and their nexuses. What is interesting is that the United States, another country symbolizing – though in a different way - the West for ordinary Russians, is featured, first, much more rarely and, secondly, in predominantly negative modalities (songs with titles like “Good-bye, America” or “America that took you away from me” are evidently self-explaining).

The discursive construction of Europe in the political and academic discourses appears to be more problematic and intricate. Even the most liberal authors treat the EU policies towards Russia’s North West as a “systemic challenge” aimed at “dislodging Russia via arbitrary inclusion of its regions into trans-national regions, as well as transportation and information flows that are to be subordinated to foreign countries”1274. The logic of Russia’s comeback to the circle of great powers is believed to be in profound conflict with the strategy of the EU which is said to lead to the disintegration of the CIS. As a gesture of symbolic retaliation, the theme of possible dismantling of the EU is not rarely debated among Russian experts.
Ultimately it is in Russia’s interest to let the ambitious though rather elementary in its intrinsic foundations (in comparison to Japan and the USA) European monster get trapped in unsolvable conflicts across Russia’s periphery. As a compensation for temporary victims in Georgia and Moldova, Russia has to reward herself in Lithuania and Poland”1275.
The state entity with its centers located in Strasbourg and Brussels is not a hotbed for those living in Kiev or Moscow, even if they think of themselves as Europeans… In the Euro-East, Russia is performing as an initiator of new forms of the European unity, and definitely is not a hindrance to it. Ultimately, Russia is in possession of a concept of Europe of its own, a wider one in comparison to what offers Brussels. This gives us the right to pedantically object to the restrictions advocated by Brussels”1276.

In this chapter, I am intended to give an overview of Russian discourses on Europe which, on a closer scrutiny, turn out to disclose some of most important means of telling the story of Russia’s self-assertion. We structure the analysis along the four lines that are derived from mostly European discourse…


  1. A EUROPE OF COLORS

Speaking in the language of colored metaphors, Russia is believed to be a part of a “gray zone”, which lies somewhere between the “white” (which, in a figurative sense, equates with the Western democracy) and the “black” (an area of despotism and all kind of illegal activities)1277. It might be presumed that Russian cultural traditions not only pinpoint this vision but also legitimize it. For example, as Mikhail Ilyin claims, white color was meant to connote with the closeness to Europe, as exemplified by “White Russia” (Belarus)1278. In the meantime, there were some occasional interpretations of demonstrating that Russia is used to feel at home with the “grey zone metaphor”. Thus, for Dmitry Zamiatin,


“Enlightenment was always an external trend for Russia, we always found ourselves in a grey area. This voluntary grayness, nevertheless, represents freedom in its original comprehension, as an ability to accept the outside sources of light”1279.

However, the Russian official discourse seems to admit a plurality of “gray zones” in Europe. One of Russia’s high-ranking diplomat has attributed the “gray zone” metaphor to the Baltic countries due to their non-participation in the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe1280.

This approach might be compared with many European authors who treats the “gray zone” as an “interim space saturated with crisis and doubts”1281, having in mind allegedly some parallels with the “gray” (“shadow”) economy metaphor widely applied, for example, to the Kaliningrad oblast (KO). Another meaning embedded in the “gray zone” metaphor is uncertainty: countries that belong to it treat themselves as buffer states, located “in-between” the core powers in the worst sense of this word, being neither accepted nor denied by the EU1282. Another meaning attached to the “gray zone” concept is the need to make a strategic decision, a breakthrough. This is because of this indeterminacy and a weak articulation of interests that “gray zones” are perceived as potential sources of conflict.

Much harsher connotations might be found in the “black box”1283 and “black hole” metaphors. To some extent, this metaphor is a spring-off of the “cosmos” - “chaos” dichotomy. It may be used not only to differentiate between “insiders” and “outsiders” of the European integration, but also to offer a perspective of moving “from the outside towards the inside” and through inclusionary articulations incite the learners to join “the European self”1284. “Cosmos”, in this reading, may symbolize ordering and institutionalization, which may be developed through concentric expansion1285. The “cosmos” - “chaos” dichotomy resembles also the distinction between Europe as a territory and Russia as a space (“an amorphous Eurasian landmass”) offered by Sergey Medvedev1286.

In the meantime, color-based metaphors might have strong bordering associations. This is the case of “red lines”, an image that either delineates the spheres beyond which the compromises between the two parties (Russia and the EU) are impossible1287, or delimits the geographic zones of influence (it was said that by accepting the three Baltic states into NATO, the Alliance would “cross the red line” established by Russia in her attempts to draw a sphere of its preponderance in Europe).

Of course, the palette given above is a discursive construct and thus is context-dependent. For example, it is known that apart from Kaliningrad, at least three other cities along EU eastern borders - Brest, L’vov and Swinoujscie - are known as major centers of gambling, sex industry and criminality. This confirms Dmitry Zamiatin’s thesis postulating that the dynamics of the image-building is consciously designed and molded by the media, the academic community and the policy- and opinion-makers1288.


Каталог: old -> Departments -> International relations
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International relations -> Материалы для чтения the four freedoms as part of europeanization process: conditions and effectiveness of the eu impact
Departments -> Учебная программа дисциплина: Физическая культура Направления подготовки: 031300. 62 031600. 62
Departments -> Учебно-методический комплекс по дисциплине " финансы и кредит" Нижний Новгород 2004 Печатается по решению редакционно-издательского совета гоу нглу им. Н. А. Добролюбова
International relations -> Материалы для чтения
International relations -> Материалы для чтения
1   ...   38   39   40   41   42   43   44   45   ...   83

  • MARGINALITY OR PROVINCIALITY PSKOV AND IVANGOROD AT THE INTERSECTION OF RUSSIA’S TRANS-BORDER RELATIONS Dr. Andrey Makarychev
  • RUSSIA’S DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE AND HERSELF: THE DECLINE OF THE OLD AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW Dr. Andrey S.Makarychev
  • A EUROPE OF COLORS