Материалы для чтения the four freedoms as part of europeanization process: conditions and effectiveness of the eu impact

Главная страница

    Главная страница

Материалы для чтения the four freedoms as part of europeanization process: conditions and effectiveness of the eu impact

Размер6.49 Mb.

1   ...   30   31   32   33   34   35   36   37   ...   83


Aalto, Pami (2004), Semi-Outsiders or Close Outsiders? Russia and Its Kaliningrad Region in European Integration. Paper to be presented at the “New World Politics” conference, 12-13 January, Hameenlinna, Finland.

Agamben, Giorgio (1998). Homo sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford University Press.

Antola, Esko (2003), Falling Apart? Diverging Trends in the Baltic Sea Region. Paper presented at the conference “A Laboratory in the Margins? The EU’s and Russia’s policies in Northern Europe”, Copenhagen, 26-27 September.

Baev, Pavel (2004), The European Troika meets in Sochi, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol.1, issue 76, September 1.

Balogh, Zoltan (2004), Implementation of New Regionalism in the CEECS. Paper presented at NISPAcee Conference in Vilnius, 13-15 May.

Belkovskii, Stanislav (2003), V otnosheniakh s novoi Evropoi Rossia dolzhna delat’ stavku na staruyu Evropu (In relations with the New Europe Russia is to rely upon the Old Europe), http://www.kreml.org/decisions/37858012/37933775

Belkovskii, Stanislav (2004), Os’ Moskva-Berlin-Parizh nosit strategicheskiy kharakter (Moscow-Berlin-Paris axis is of strategic importance), “Krelm.org” Political Expertise Network web site, http://www.kreml.org/opinions/64381590

Boratynski, Jakub and Gromadzki, Grzegorz (2001), The Half-Open Door: the Eastern Border of the Enlarged European Union. Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, Policy Papers, March.

Bordachov, Konstantin (2004), Rossiya i Evropeiskii Soyuz: konets i novoe nachalo (Russia and the EU: an end and a new beginning). Briefing of the Moscow Carnegie Center, N 10, October.

Bukharin, Nikolay (2001), Rossiya i Pol’sha: obozrimye perspektivy (Russia and Poland: Foreseeable Perspectives), http://www.ieras.ru/journal/journal2.2001/11.html

Bukharin, Nikolai (2004), Rossiisko-pol’skie otnoshenia i vstuplenie Pol’shi v ES (Russian-Polish relations and Poland’s accession to the EU), Vestnik Evropy, N 11, http:///magazines.russ.ru/vestnik/2004/11/bu3-pr.html

Bychkov, V.A., and Krupnov, Yu.V. (2002), Kaliningrad – klyuch k Novoy Evrope (Kaliningrad as a key to the New Europe), www.pereplet.ru/text/krupnov16aug02.html

Cichocki, Jacek; Cichocki, Marek and Kowal, Pawel (2002), Poland and the EU’s “Eastern Dimension, in Pawel Kowal (ed.). The EU’s “Eastern Dimension” – An Opportunity for or Idee Fixe of Poland’s Policy. Warsaw: Centre for International Relations.

Chekaliova-Demidovskaya, Maria (2003), Cherez god u nas budet noviy sosed (We’ll get a new neighbour in a year), Vremia Sodruzhestva, N 1, winter-spring, www.mpa.ru

Communication from the Commission. A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the Union. Brussels, 25/11/98. COM/98/0589 Final.

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on relations with Russia. COM(2004)106, 09/02/04.

Cronberg, Tarja (2003), A Europe without Divides? The EU-Russia Partnership and the Case of Virtual Borders. Copenhagen: COPRI Working Paper, http://www.copri.dk/copri/researchers/cronberg/tc.htm

Dale, Reginald (2004), European divisions don’t help America, International Herald Tribune, June 23.

Danilov, Dmitry (2000), Rossiya v bol’shoi Evrope: strategiya bezopasnosti (Russia in Larger Europe; Security Strategy), http://www.ieras.ru/journal/journal2.2000/5.htm

Deleuze, Gilles Pourparlers, 1972-1990. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.

Diez, Thomas (2004), Europe’s Other and the Return of Geopolitics, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol.17, N 2, July.

Dugin, Alexander (2003), Franko-germanskaya imperia: zdes’ i seichas (Franco-German empire: here and right now), Izvestia, February 6, http://mai.izvestia.ru/print/?id=29747

Fedotova, V.G. (1997), Modernizatsiya “drugoi” Evropy (Modernization of a ‘Different Europe’). Moscow: Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Fiodorov, Yu.P. (2004), Noviy Atlantism protiv starogo evropeizma (New Atlanticism vs. Old Europeanism), Evropeiskaya bezopasnost’: sobytiya, otsenki, prognozy, N 8. Moscow: INION, Center for European Security Studies.

Foucault, Michel (1972), The Archeology of Knowledge, Routledge.

Fuller, Graham (2003), “Old Europe” or “Old America”, New Perspectives Quarterly. Vol.20, N 2, spring.

Gromadzki, Grzegorz and Osica, Olaf (2002), Pro-European Atlantists: Poland and Other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe After the Accession to the European Union. Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation & Centre for International Relations. Policy Papers 3, www.batory.org.pl.

Haukkala, Hiski (2002), A Hole in the Wall? Dimensionalism and the EU's 'New Neighborhood Policy'. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) Working Papers, N 41.

Huisman, Sander (2002), A new European Union policy for Kaliningrad. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Papers, N 33, March.

Hyndle, Joanna and Kutysz, Miryna (2002), Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia’s aspirations to integrate with NATO and the EU in the context of these countries’ relations with Russia. CES Studies, N 4, May. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies.

Iglicka, Krystyna (2003), Priorities and Developmental Directions of Polish Migration Policy. Warsaw: The Institute of Public Affairs. Analysis & Opinions, N 13.

Jervell, Sverre (1992), A Report from Europe’s Northern Periphery, in The Baltic Sea Area – A Region in the making. Edited by Mare Kukk, Sverre Jervell and Pertti Joenniemi. Oslo & Karlskrona: Europa-programmet and the Baltic Institute, pp.11-25.

Joenniemi, Pertti (1995), Regionality: A Sovereign Principle of International Relations? In Peaceful Changes in World Politics. Ed.by Heikki Patomaki. Tampere Peace Research Institute, Research Report N 71, pp. 337-374.

Joenniemi, Pertti (2004), Europe 'New' and 'Old': on the Power of Drawing Distinctions. Paper presented at the seminar of the European Studies Department, Danish Institute for International Studies, February 25.

Joenniemi, Pertti (2005), The EU’s New Neighborhood Policy: Probing the Impact in Europe’s North and South, in: The EU and Russia’s North-West: a Playground for Innovations? Ed.by Andrey Makarychev. Nizhny Novgorod University Press.

Ilyin, Mikhail (2003), Problemy formirovaniya Ostrova Rossii i kontury ego vnutrenney geopolitiki (Issues of molding the Island of Russia and the Contours of its domestic geopolitics), “Russian Archipelago”, a Networking Project of the Russian World web site, http:(//www.archipelag.ru/text/267.htm

Kakonen, Jyrki (1998), Local Dimensions and Regionalisation, in Lassi Heininen and Jyrki Kakonen (eds.). The New North Europe. Perspectives on Northern Dimension. Tampere Peace Research Institute, research Report N 80.

Karabeshkin, Leonid and Wellmann, Christian (2004), The Russian Domestic Debate on Kaliningrad: Integrity, Identity and Economy, SCHIFF Band 11, Lit Verlag and Transaction Publisher.

Karaganov, Sergey (2004a), Farsovaya kholodnaya voina? (Farce-style Cold War?), Rossiiskaya gazeta, February 25.

Karaganov, Sergey (2004b), Rossya i Evropa: vmeste ili po sosedstvu? (Russia – Europe: Together or by the Virtue of Neighborhood?), “Russia in Global Politics” Journal web site, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/articles/2890.html

Kazin Filip (2002), Zakat tranzitologii, ili seraia zona Evropy? (The Dawn of Transit Studies, or Europe's Gray Zone). Center for Integration Research and Projects, St.Petersburg, October, www.cirp.ru/publications/kazin/transition_cont.htm.

Kazin, Filip (2003). Kakaya Bol'shaya Evropa nam nuzhna? (What Kind of Big Europe We Need). Sodruzhestvo portal, www.mpa.ru:8081/analytics/issue.php/id=245

Kazin, Filip (2004), Faktor limitrofov v otnosheniyakh Rossii s Evrosoyuzom, International Trends. Journal of International Relations Theory and World Politics, vol.2, n 1(4), January-August, pp.96-100.

Kennedy, Paul (2003), Old Europe Cannot Be a Counterweight to the American Imperium, New Perspectives Quarterly. Vol.20, N 3, summer.

Kivikari, Upro (1996), The Legacy of Hansa. The Baltic Economic Region. Helsinki: Otava Publishing Company Limited.

Khramchikhin, Alexander (2004), Vrag u vorot (An enemy behind the gates), Russkii zhurnal, March 31, http://www.russ.ru/columns/march/20040331-nato-pr.html

Kholmogorov, Egor (2002), Evropa ot zakata do rassveta (Europe from sunset to sunrise), Russkii zhurnal, June 18, http://www.russ.ru/politics/20020618-holm-pr.html

Kononczuk, Wojciech (2003), Vostochnoe izmerenie ES: pol'skaya pozitsia (The EU's Eastern Dimension: the Polish Standpoint). Sodruzhestvo Portal (November 25), www.mpa.ru:8081/analytics/issue.php?id=244

Kuus, Merje (2004), “Europe’s Eastern Expansion and the Re-inscription of Otherness in East-Central Europe”, Progress in Human Geography (forthcoming).

Luchterhandt, Otto (2003), Rossiya v Evrope (Russia in Europe), Neprikosnovenniy zapas, N 4 (30).

Lukianov, Fiodor (2004), Prizrak nad Evroppoi (A Ghost on Europe), http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2004/06/a_127704.shtml?

Medvedev, Sergey (1998), Catholic Europe, marginal Russia, and postmodern North. An essay on the origins and limits of the European project. Helsinki: Finnish Institute for International Studies, “Northern Dimensions”, N 1.

Militarev, Viktor and Denisov, Mikhail (2004), Rossiya – Latviya: v poiskakh obschego yazyka (Russia – Latvia: in search of a common language), http://vip.lenta.ru/fullstory/2004/03/08/latvia/_Printed.htm

Miniotaite, Grazina (2004), Lithuania's New Neighbor Policy in the Framework of the EU's 'Wider Europe-Neighborhood' Initiative. Vilnius: a report draft, March.

Morozov, Viacheslav (2003a), V poiskakh Evropy: rossiiskiy politicheskiy diskurs i okruzhayuschiy mir (In search for Europe: Russian political discourse and the outside world), Neprikosnovenniy zapas, N 4(30), http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2003/4/moroz-pr.html

Morozov, Viacheslav (2003b), Russia and the Baltic States: Letting Go of a Troubled Past, Russia and Eurasia Review, vol. II, issue 16, August 5.

Morozov, Viacheslav (2004), Inside/Outside: Europe and the Boundaries of Russian Political Community. Research paper to be presented at the PONARS Academic Conference, Seattle, May.

Munkler, Herfried (1996), Europa als politische Idee // Reich – Nation – Europa. Modelle politischer Ordnung. Weinheim: Beltz, pp. 97-150.

Neufeld, Mark (1995), The Restructuring of International Relations Theory. Cambridge University Press.

Neumann, Iver (1998), Uses of the Other. “The East” in European Identity Formation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Newman, David (2003), Theorizing Borders. The Working Paper of the Project on EU Border Conflicts, www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk

Nifontov, Vadim (2002), Chto takoe Evropa (What is Europe), http://udod.traditio.ru/euro.htm

Nikolaev, Andrey (2000), Vishegradskaya troika i voz evropeiskikh problem (The Visegrad troika and the burdens of European troubles), Obozrevatel’ – Observer, N 7, http://www.nasledie.ru/oboz/N07_00/07_07.HTM

Parvulesco, Jean (2003), Anti-mondialistskaya strategiya osi Parizh – Berlin – Moskva (Anti-mondialiste strategy of Paris – Berlin – Moscow axis), Poliarnaya Zvezda journal web site, http://zvezda.ru/print.php?area=1&id=208&sub=11

Pavlovskii, Gleb (2004), Rossiya vsio eschio ischet svoiy rol’ v mire (Russia is still in search of its worldwide role), Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 31.

Privalov (2004), Odinochestvo Evropy (Europe’ Solitude), Itogi, N 9 (403), March 3.

Privalov, Kirill and Sychova, Valeria (2004), Rossiya na globuse Evropy (Russia in the Europe’s Globe), Itogi, N 17 (411), April 29.

Rasmussen, Niels Aadal (2005), The EU Enlargement Eastwards and the ESDP. DIIS Report 2005:7. Danish Institute for International Studies, April.

Remizov, Mikhail (2001a), Zkvozniak (A Draft), Russkii zhurnal, October 19, http://www.russ.ru/politics/20011019-eur-pr.html

Remizov, Mikhail (2001b), Pokhitim Evropu? (Kidnapping Europe?), Russkii zhurnal, October 12, http://www.russ.ru/politics/20011012-rem-pr.html

Riekstins, Maris (2004), Riding the waves of foreign affairs, The Baltic Times, May 13-19.

Right, Richard (2003), V dvukh shagakh ot Bol'shoi Evropy (In two steps from the Big Europe), Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 29.

Rossiya i Evropa: k novoi povestke dnia (Russia and Europe: Towards a New Agenda). Theses of the Council on Foreign & Defense Policy, http://www.svop.ru

Rossiya kak Novaya Evropa (Russia as New Europe). Publication of the Trans-continental Laboratory, “Europe from Kitezh to Alaska” Project, http://europe.inache.net/neweuro.html

Russkaya Evropa ili Evrosovok? (2004), Trans-laboratory “Russian Party of the European Union”, http://europe.inache.net/ruparty.html

Scott, James Wesley (2002), Baltic Sea Regionalism, EU Geopolitics and Symbolic Geographies of Cooperation, Journal of Baltic Studies. Vol.XXXIII, N 2, summer.

Schlogel, Carl (2003), “Evropa – pogranichnaya stana” (Europe as a border country), Vestnik Evropy, N 9, http://magazines.russ.ru/vestnik/2003/9/shleg-pr.html

Shastik, Natalia (2003), Evropeskiy dekadans (European Decay), Russkii zhurnal, May 12, http://www.russ.ru/politics/200030512-shas-pr.html

Smith, Anna Marie (1998), Laclau and Mouffe: the radical democratic imaginary. London & New York: Routledge.

Stalvant, Carl-Einar (2001), The Northern Dimension: A Policy in Need of an Institution. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdanskiego & Nordeuropa-Institut der Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, Gdansk-Berlin.

Stavrakakis, Yannis (1999), Lacan and the Political. London & New York: Routledge.

Sutela, Pekka (2005), EU, Russia, and Common Economic Space. Bank of Finland, BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition, BOFIT Online, N 3.

Schlegel, Karl (2003), Evropa – pogranichnaya strana (Europe as a borderland), Vestnik Evropy, N 9, http://magazines.russ.ru/vestnik/2003/9/shleg-pr.html

Shimov, Yaroslav (2001), Chetyre Evropy (Four Europes), Russkii zhurnal, February 27, http://www.russ.ru/politics/grammar/20010227-eur-pr.html

Sztompka, Piotr (2004), From East Europeans to Europeans: Shifting Identities and Boundaries in the New Europe. The Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies: Ortelius Lecture 3.

Tavares, Rodrigo (2004), Contribution of macro-regions to the construction of peace: a framework for analysis, Journal of International Relations and Development, vol.7, N 1, April, pp.24-44.

Tsymburskii, Vadim (2002), Evropa mezhdu Evraziei i Evroafrikoi (Europe between Eurasia and Euro-Africa), Russkii zhurnal, June 24, http://www.russ.ru/politics/20020624-tzim-pr.html

V uzlakh transportanoi seti (Knotted by transportation network). Paper edited by Piotr Schedrovitskii. KB Group web site, http://future-design.ru/index.cfm?id=6&materal=196

Waever, Ole (1992), Regionalization in Europe and in the Baltic Sea Area, in Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Area. The Second Parliamentary Conference on Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Area. Report from a Conference arranged by the Nordic Council at Stortinget, Oslo, Norway, 22-24 April.

Wallace, William (2003), Looking After the Neighborhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25. Groupement d’etudes et de recherches “Notre Europe”, Policy Papers N 4, July.

Wennersten, Peter (1999), The Politics of Inclusion. The Case of the Baltic States, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 34 (3).

Wider Europe / Eastern and Southern Neighbours: Food for thought (2003). Note from Presidency 8395/03, Council of the European Union. Brussels, 10 April.

Zagorskii, Andrey (2003), V poiskakh systemnosti: kak pereiti ot slov k delu (In search for a system approach: how to proceed from words to deeds), in Filip Kazin and Vladimir Kuznetsov (eds.), Vostochnoe izmerenie ES i Rossiya (The EU’s Eastern Dimension and Russia). St.Petersburg: Proceeding of International Conference.

Zagorskii, Andrey (2004), ‘Samodostatochnaya’ Rossiya v Evropeiskoy i mirovoy politike (’Self-Sufficient’ Russia in European and World Politics), in Vtoroi srok prezidentskogo pravleniya V.Putina: dilemmy rossiiskoy politiki (The Second Term of Putin’s Presidency: Dilemmas of the Russian Politics). Moscow: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Zamiatin, Dmitry (2000), “Strategii interpretatsii istoriko-geograficheskikh obrazov Rossii” (Strategies of interpreting the historic-geographical images of Russia), Otechestvennye zapiski, N 6.

Zamiatin, Dmitry (2001), “Geograficheskie obrazy mirovogo razvitia”(Geographical images of the world development), Obschestvennye nauki i sovremennost', N 1.

Zamiatin, Dmitry (2004), Rossiya: geograficheskie obrazy (Russia: Geographic Images), “Political News” Agency, a web project of the National Strategy Institute, www.apn.ru, September 24.

Zizek, Slavoj (1989), The Sublime Object of Ideology. London & New York: Verso.

Zizek, Slavoj (1999), The Ticklish Subject. The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. London – New York: Verso.

Zizek, Slavoj (2002), For they know not what they do. Enjoyment as a Political Factor. Second edition. London & New York: Verso.

The Zizek Reader (1999). Edited by Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Wright. Blackwell Publishers.

Andrey S.Makarychev

Knowledgeable people will certainly confirm how intricate and ambiguous is the language of the EU officials. How one can explain, for example, that the EU relations with Russia are expected to be “strengthened”, while relations with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus ought to be “enhanced”944? How one can discern – with a certain degree of intelligibility - a semantic difference between “the strategic partnership” and a “reinforced relationship”945 in reference to one country - Russia, especially when both notions are mentioned in a single document? How exactly one can find a logical difference between two semantic “twins” - “the overall aim” and “the ultimate objective”946, again utilized interchangeably in a single text, then leading to a sudden and quite ironic appearance of a hybrid notion of “overall objective” (a combination which leaves aside for some reason another possible constellation – “ultimate aim”)?

The uncovering of precise meaning of key notions lavishly employed in the EU documents concerning the whole spectrum of relations with Russia is a hard job. For example, there is some uncertainty in the usage of “instrument” as an operational concept in EU’s policies towards its immediate neighbours, including Russia. ‘Instrument’ is widely conceived as “a new mechanism for financing trans-border cooperation between Member States and neighbouring countries”947. Yet another – and arguably competing - interpretation equates instruments with Association Agreements signed by the EU with its neighbours948. In a different context instruments are referred to much more general issues such as market opening, regulatory convergence, trade facilitation and infrastructure network development949. The general picture may become even more astonishingly fragmented as soon as one accepts another version of “instruments” as “technical assistance and twinning”950.

In this paper I insist that the terminological mess partly depicted above is not a matter of mere incompetence or simple coincidence; it has to be faced as a constitutive element of the EU discursive strategy of uncertainty, which presupposes leaving as much room as possible for different interpretations of basic concepts that form the background of the EU – Russia relations. The stricter is the definitional apparatus, the fewer possibilities are in a possession of diplomats for manoeuvering and keeping options open. And vice versa, the elasticity of key definitions offers ample opportunities for everlasting re-invention and re-reading of key concepts, which might be a comfortable practicality in situations of multiple choices.

There are two major sources of methodological inspiration that were used in this analysis. Firstly, in this paper I apply the approaches dating back to Michel Foucault to the sphere of the EU – Russia connections. In a Foucauldian sense, the research tasks would be to find out the rules and conditions that predetermine the formation of certain statements pertinent to the topical area under question; to uncover the hidden intentions staying behind the various discourses; to fix the semantic boundaries of these discourses; to understand their correlations and interconnections with each other; to explain what traces were left by these discourses and how these traces could be utilized and re-utilized in political purposes; to comprehend how the discourses under considerations are institutionalized, publicly accepted or rejected/criticized; to see how the groups of statements re-organize the pre-existing fields composed of diverse discursive elements, and how they draw new lines of inclusion and exclusion.

This paper also ventures to explain the institutional deficiencies in the EU-Russia cooperation through discourse analysis. In Foucauldian terms, discourses converge with social practices, they are revealed in a set of social relations that change due to discourses themselves. Arguably, it is definitional inconsistencies that are conducive to policy imperfections and failures. This is also a Foucauldian approach grounded in pointing to close inter-correlations between discourses, on the one hand, and social institutions, types of behaviour, expectations, demands and practices, on the other. Policy-makers might be easily disoriented and misled by multiple ambiguities embedded in official texts, while the EU – Russia communication may turn into an imitation of cooperation: in a felicitous remark of Michael Emerson, “the EU pretended to be constructing a set of common European policy spaces with Russia, and Russia pretended to be converging on common European values”951.

Secondly, the reading of the EU official discourse on Russia through Foucauldian lenses seems to be quite compatible with the ideas developed by Yurii Lotman, known as a founder of the Tartu-based school of semiotics. In particular, I found quite relevant Lotman’s understanding of the language as a certain code which the recipient uses as a tool to decipher the messages addressed to him/her. Therefore, the process of communication envisions a set of rules for both “speakers” and “listeners”. Of particular interest is the indication to the fact that one text may contain a number of meanings – supposedly, a more professionally prepared reader will be able to discern in it a lot more than an “ignoramus”952.

I’ll venture to demonstrate that a combination of two traditions in discourse analysis – dating back to Foucault and Lotman – opens a good perspective for research in the EU discourse on Russia.

Semantic Couples as a Discursive Tool

That the EU does not speak with a single language while dealing with Russia is a matter of fact which could be easily testified. However, the key question remains: is this evident discursive ambiguity a sporadic and uncontrollable result of the EU bureaucratic machinery tending to produce a variety of loosely defined concepts, or it has to be considered as an intentional way of what could be hypothetically called “managing the uncertainty”, or – in other words - using different discourses for different scenarios which are being (or might be) considered.

The first type of explanation appears to be too facile. My point, largely inspired by the texts of Michel Foucault, is that there are no useless or meaningless phrases and sentences; each of the discursive elements is destined, in one way or another, to play a certain role which needs to be unpacked and, perhaps, re-signified. Sometimes behind rather simple and obvious wording one can uncover a hidden meaning. It is in this sense that statements are usually open for multiple – and frequently competing – interpretations, being built into certain types of articulations. Within these articulations, statements (“order-words”953) are given their status and an expanse for circulation, they become capable of entering other semantic fields (or, in Foucauldian vocabulary, “archeological territories”) and serving certain political purposes. For example, Russia could be called “an important partner” or a “strategic partner”, semantically depending on a political situation, while the idea of “strategic partnership” - officially announced yet still open for multiple interpretations - could be easily reduced to a mere “fruitful cooperation”954.

Ambiguity was always inscribed into the realm of the EU – Russia official documents. The following statement seems to be extremely indicative of this state of affairs: the bilateral trade regime, according to the texts of the 12th summit in Rome (2003), has to be “based on common, harmonized or compatible rules”955. What is telling in this phrase is that the three different modalities of economic relations were mentioned in a single row, turning the whole statement into a sort of universal menu in which everyone is free to choose an option of his/her own liking.

Another perfect manifestation of this uncertainty is a formula of interaction once offered by the EU to its neighbours: “more than partnership and less than membership”956. This enunciation invites for at least two types of interrogation. First of all, it seems to reduce the very concept of partnership which seems to loose its spirit of preferentiality: in a literal sense, the neighbourhood policy has to be considered as something more important than partnership arrangements. Secondly, in this semantic scheme, partnership and membership represent two poles of an unspecified spectrum of policy options open for consideration. It is not quite clear however what lays inside of it: traditional “external actions”957, a policy of proximity, good-neighborhood relations, or perhaps something else.

The status of Russia herself as a partner country may be put under question as well. Here is another telling quotation: “Should Russia become a democratic and co-operative partner, it can contribute significantly to building stability and prosperity in the region”958. Therefore, the partnership arrangements are not unconditionally taken by the EU for granted, as the title of PCA suggests; they are subject to political conjuncture. In the same text one may discover that cooperation could be of different types: “close”, “confident”, “consistent”, etc. The “policy of adjectives”, based upon diversification of key concepts, is meant to expand the EU operational capabilities in order to be ready and able to pick up the definition it feels appropriate at a certain moment.

In fact, from the very beginning of 1990s, there were two different discursive strategies inscribed in what conventionally is regarded as the EU Russian discourse. These two strategies are differently structured and, what is more important, are coined for different political purposes. This discursive cohabitation is nicely reflected in the very title of the “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement”. Few commentators noticed that the title itself contains a sort of uncertainty incarnated in a tacit and alleged opposition between the two key words. One may wonder why both of them gave birth to famous PCA abbreviation. As soon as one logically admits that cooperation is simply a particular case of partnership, the simultaneous usage of the two terms would turn into a mere tautology.

Yet there could be an alternative (and less banal) explanation pointing to the intrinsically dual and ambiguous nature of the EU discursive approach to Russia. The “partnership and cooperation” couple could be therefore split/decomposed into two autonomous and self-sustaining types of discursive articulations. The table attached is meant to illustrate the divergence between the logic of partnership and that one of cooperation. Each of these two poles is to be viewed, on the one hand, as a “nodal point”, i.e. privileged discursive point of reference “that fixes the meaning of a signifying chain”959. Again, this is a Foucauldian move to identify the center of discourse (a locus where it is formed) and its periphery. On the other hand, these two poles are “floating signifiers”, i.e. political concepts open to interpretation and redefinition960, which each time ought to be filled with more or less specific chain of concepts.

Here are some other semantic couples which are easily identifiable in the EU documents:

Discursive Strategy 1
Discursive Strategy 2

The background of the EU assistance to Russia

Reciprocity / benchmarking


The current state of the EU – Russia relations

Integration / close association / convergence

Engagement / approximation / rapprochement

The strategic landmarks in bilateral relationship

(Strong / strategic) partnership

Cooperation / reinforced relationship / dialogue

Type of policy the EU is pursuing

Neighborhood policy

Proximity policy

Russia’s role



Fields of mutual interests


Zones / areas / spheres

As one may see, the first group of inter-related concepts reflects a more Russia-friendly discourse presupposing a pretty close state of bilateral relations (what I call for convenience ‘Discursive Strategy 1’). The second column of notions is most appropriate for a scenario of strained relations with Russia marked by less pronounced enthusiasm and much stronger reservations, if not doubts, concerning the perspectives of bilateral projects (‘Discursive Strategy 2’). In a Foucauldian approach, what unites these two types of “verbal realizations” is their focus on the same object, the more or less similar style of enunciation, and topical sustainability. The differences between the two are grounded, first, in the way their elementary details are tied to each other, which leads to different hierarchies of signs that constitute the discourse. Secondly, the internal logics and intentions that shape each of the two discourses seem to be also different.

The Foucauldian reading of the EU – Russian relations presupposes a number of important logical operations. One of them would be to find the points of equivalence between the two discourses. Different words, indeed, sometimes produce similar, if not identical meanings. This is the case of “reinforced” and “strengthened” relations, the two adjectives that could be used interchangeably to substitute each other without any visible harm to their semantics.

The second operation would be to identify possible points of incompatibility. The whole idea here is based on the fact that the same words could be attributed different meanings and, therefore, may belong to different discursive strategies. An appropriate example could be found in different interpretation of the nature of “pilot region” (as applicable to the Kaliningrad oblast) in Russia and the EU. The spread of self-consciously technical project-oriented discourses stands in contrast to the more political (at first glance) Russian discourses of ‘strategic partnership’, which located all major issues in EU-Russian relations in the domain of interstate, frequently bilateral, dialogue on the level of political leadership.

The third operation would be to define the status of the discursive strategies under consideration and the degree of their formalization. Using Foucauldian terminology, the EU – Russia “Four Spaces” discursive field could be located between the “threshold of positivity” (a stage of individualization and autonomization of discursive practices) and the “threshold of epistemologization” (a stage at which a certain group of statements tends to play a role of a dominant explanatory model). To put it differently, the Four Spaces discourse, still lacking due clarity and conceptual precision, aspires to hegemonize the field of the EU – Russia relations. A good indication of these discursive ambitions is the transformation of the Northern Dimension which is expected to become “the regional expression on the North of Europe of the four Common Spaces and their road maps”961.

The fourth operation would be to decompose the discourses we study into a number of “layers”. These may include: single/separate discursive elements (key words – see table above); concepts that predetermine strategic choices; new rules of forming the discursive practices. One concept, therefore, may unleash a chain of other related departures, the topic to be dealt with in more details below.

From Neighbourhood to Spatiality

This is within this context that the concept of “spaces” has to be deployed. The employment of the terminology of “spaces” seems to open a number of interesting research insights on how the discursive strategy of uncertainty looks like.

The problem with the spatial terminology is that it lacks a single discursive tradition. It is intuitively tempting to equate “space” with something open, de-bordered, indefinite, uncontested and indivisible. In this context, spatiality could be contrasted with territoriality, including a variety of its derivatives (like “zones”, “areas” and “spheres”) which are basically interest-driven and territorially-based concepts (for example, “spheres of influence”). Therefore, spatiality and territoriality, as two concepts, may be seen as opposing and contrasting each other: space appears to be a symbol of universality, while territory is a collection of regional singularities. Yet in the meantime, these two notions may at certain point converge and overlap, forming – paradoxically enough – a single mode of conceptualization. Spatiality, being part of post-structuralist discursive tradition, presupposes and is complemented by a kind of “topological” thinking which hinges on such concepts as ruptures, lines, surfaces, dimensions, etc. It is at this point that space-centric discursive practices generate the necessity of “road maps” as symbols of this “topological” approach.

Spaces, however, could bear different connotations; for example, Gilles Deleuze used to speak about “spaces of isolation” and “closed spaces”, those split by sectors962, while some of geopolitical thinkers interpreted space as a “framework of expansion”. Therefore, space could be called a “megametaphor”, or “ontological script meant to anchor conventional assumption about who are political agents, where are they based, what is political, and how they behave”963. “Regional spaces” are usually viewed in a very uncertain way, as areas that “have a certain degree of singularity, despite the non-existence of strong elements of any other sort that tie the agents”964. This is uncertainty that distinguishes spaces from a plethora of more specific “order-words”, like, for example, pillars.

Given the variety of semantic fillings, “space” admittedly turns into an “empty signifier”, permanently open for (re)interpretations and infusions of new meanings. The metaphor of space offers a good semantic frame that is compatible with both “dimensionalist” approach (the semantic link between spaces and dimensions was duly grasped, for example, by Michael Emerson965) and a more state-centric scheme of concentric circles and “binary borders”966.

Politically, spaces – as understood in the road maps of 2005 – are part of an optimistic “Discursive Strategy 1” identified earlier. This optimism is, nonetheless, of a very peculiar nature: thus, within the original EU-based conception of “Freedom, Security and Justice”, Russia was positioned as a source of danger, and not as a constitutive element of this “triangle”. Later on, as a gesture of radical re-signification, Russia was invited to join this initiative that, to repeat, earlier has envisaged the estrangement of Russia, or, in mildest terms, presupposed keeping her at a distance.

But semantically, spaces however are just a mere vague substitute for something common and shared, a catchword borrowed from academic milieu and implanted in a highly politicized soil. In this sense, the way spaces are understood in the sphere of the EU – Russia relations, appears – perhaps quite unexpectedly – to be rather close to a Foucauldian reading of space as a communicative, mental and semantic construct, a field where discourses are being formed and meanings produced. Spaces could be understood as laboratories that accumulate and spread ideas expressed as discursive constellations, identify points of incompatibility and equivalence of their elements.

It has to be recalled that the idea of “spaces” has appeared in the EU – Russia discourse in the aftermath of Moscow’s disavowal of her participation in the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy). To officially recognize herself as a mere neighbour was a gesture of humiliation for Russia (a stance verbalized in a famous phrase pointing to the fact that Russia is not a Morocco). The irony was that Russia became the only country bordering on the EU that refused to recognize herself as its neighbour in the sense that Brussels attached to this word. Therefore, a substitution for the rejected neighbour status has to be quickly invented, unless the EU wished to keep Russia at a distance.

What is even more telling is that the transition from the ENP to the Four Common Spaces reveals the difference between the two forms of political subjectivity that Russia could think of. The ENP, to a certain degree, could be viewed as a failed “act of interpellation”: the EU called Russia a neighbour but she refused to recognize herself in this capacity. By this gesture of disavowal, Russia opted for a different pathway of gaining her subjectivity – not through accepting and legitimizing the EU’s interpellative call (and the symbolic identity attached to it), but through resisting to it. This is from here that the idea of “subjectivity through exception” comes from967. To put it differently, this is a certain form of exceptional arrangement (based upon Russia’s symbolic exclusion from the group of the EU neighbours) that forms and sustains Russia’s subjectivity vis-à-vis European Union.

Yet the “process of self-exception”968, as exemplified by Russia’s voluntary removal from the ENP area, was an incomplete one, since Russia has to find a right balance between stressing her individuality/peculiarity, on the one hand, and staying in close touch with the EU, on the other. By presenting herself as an exception in terms of the EU-developed neighbourhood policy, Russia had to simultaneously engage in a controversial game of inclusion and exclusion. The combination of these two dispositions rendered an interesting and somehow unexpected effect: the Four Spaces displayed the features of both exception and example. To illustrate this slightly provocative argument, let me refer to Giorgio Agamben: “if we define the exception as an inclusive exclusion, in which something is included by means of its exclusion, the example functions as an exclusive inclusion. Something is excluded by means of its very inclusion”969. Seen from this theoretical angle, the Four Spaces edifice manifests the characteristics of not only an exceptional institutional arrangement between the EU and Russia, but also that ones of an example, a model of integration to link two different entities, each one possessing its own subjectivity.

In particular, one may treat the road maps as a model in strictly Lotmanian sense – namely, as an analogue of reality (for Lotman, each discourse is not only a communicative but also a modeling system). Usually, in politics practical activities tend to be separated from “working with models”; yet there are situations which seem to avoid such a separation – these are game-related forms of communication between the subjects in question. It is within this context that we have to deploy the concept of “language games” involving – though in different roles - both the EU and Russia. Language games is “one of the pathways of turning an abstract idea into a form of behaviour/activity”970 and an epistemological instrument which allows for modeling a variety of encounters between the two subjects. The specificity of the game-ridden epistemology is rooted in a simultaneous activation of two types of behaviour – the first one has to acknowledge the limitations of the game-related conditionality, while the second one has to take the game situation as something reflecting practical dispositions of all parties included971. Arguably, the coming into being of the vocabulary of spaces was but a continuation of the language quibble rounded in the fact that the Four Spaces symbolic construct is based upon what might be called, following Zizek, “the central Void”. “The central element … has to remain empty in order to serve as the underlying organizing principle”972 of the discourse.

Therefore, the Four Spaces is, in a way, an inter-subjective construct. To put it differently, all of them are bi-centric (if not bicephalous) spaces, formally instituted by both Russia and the EU. On a deeper level of inquiry, the allegedly inter-subjective background of the Four Spaces could be grounded in and interpreted by a formula nicely described by Slavoj Zizek as “include me out973. In similar terms of Giorgio Agamben, the nature of the Four Spaces could be understood as a peculiar case of “inclusive exclusion” which serves “to include what is excluded”. In other words, “what cannot be included in any way is included in the form of the exception”974. This is exactly what the whole conception of the Four Freedoms is about. It certainly has much to do with the “ordering of space that is, according to Carl Schmitt, constitutive of the sovereign nomos” in the form of “taking of the outside”, namely Russia.

The distinction between Russia and the EU, perceived in terms of a “chaos – cosmos” dichotomy, adds to this understanding. For Agamben, “since there is no rule applicable to chaos”, it must “be included in the juridical order through the creation of a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, chaos and normal situation”, which is conceptualized as “the state of exception”. To continue this logic, “the exception is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member” (Russia is geographically and culturally an undeniable member of the European family of nations and cultures) “and cannot be a member of the whole in which it is always already included”975 (Russia’s membership in the EU will evidently undermine the institutional structures of the Union). Interestingly enough, Russian political elite, according to a widely spread view, is eager to “become part of the EU without joining this union… to be almost within the EU but simultaneously to avoid having to fulfill orders given by it”976. Parenthetically, it could be noted that this logic of accommodation mirrors the EU strategy of presenting itself as the subject without taking political moves, as a key international player which in the meantime evades a great deal of responsibility for its actions.

In the meantime, a zone of exception could be conceptualized as something laying at the intersection of “localization” (i.e. sub-national regions’ activities) and “ordering” (i.e. the neighborhood policy of the EU). This zone “takes the shape of a free and juridically empty space in which the sovereign power no longer knows the limits fixed by the nomos as the territorial order”. Two readings of this “empty space” are possible. The first one may treat it as a gray zone dominated by shadow market operations widely spread in trans-border milieu. Yet in the second context, “the state of exception” could be understood in an innovative sense, as being synonymous with experimentation, piloting, and so on. Therefore, the application of Agamben’s approaches to the Four Spaces may offer a wider modality of exceptions, otherwise associated with predominantly negative connotations.

Bilateralism in this sense is a form of exceptionalism pointing to a privileged status of Russia and individual, country-specific, if not unique, arrangements standing apart from the others977. To a certain degree, this exceptionalism is due to the fact that the whole idea of the Four Spaces was initiated by France and Germany and, therefore, may be viewed as an “Old Europe”’s project978. The “new European” nations (including the Visegrad4 and the Baltic states) are expected to “strengthen the political demands of the Union within the four common spaces”979, by now almost absent in the communications between Moscow, on the one hand, and Berlin and Paris, on the other.

However, it seems unlikely that Russia feels happy about reaching this kind of compromise based on her exceptionality. Intuitively, Russia anticipates that the “New Neighborhood” idiom might in the nearest future efface the semantics of “Near Abroad”. Yet more important sources of Russian criticism are grounded in disagreements with the basic ideas of the Four Freedoms. What appears to be an inter-subjective construct, turns out to be used as an instrument meant for a sort of “subordinate adaptation”. In particular, some of Russian analysts deem that “the Common Economic Space is not really intended to foster further economic integration … but to make Russia accept certain rules and to force it into a certain framework”980. A similar viewpoint could be found in the European literature as well: “The mechanism of cooperation is simple: in return for effective implementation of reforms (including aligning national legislation with the EU acquis), EU will grant closer economic integration with the prospect of realizing the so-called Four Freedoms”981. According to a Finnish analyst, “the adoption of first the common European economic space and later the four common spaces can be seen as attempts to “operationalize” the rather monolithic and abstract obligation for Russia to harmonize its trade-related laws and rules with that of the EU acquis982. Perhaps, the most intransigent position was taken by the Moscow-based Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) which lambasted the Four Freedoms for unilateral concessions from the Russian side, lack of legal precision, arbitrary interpretation of key terms used in the road maps, and procedural opaqueness. In SVOP’s opinion, the Four Freedoms are merely an intermediary stage in the EU – Russia relationship and reflect the lack of long-term vision in both Moscow and Brussels983. It appears that the philosophy of the Four Spaces, understood as a “package deal”, could be countered by a philosophy of “concrete, specific projects” advocated, in particular, by a task force led by the SVOP leading figure Sergey Karaganov.

A final point of interrogation could be raised. Both Russia and the EU are entities in a state of flux. In Vladimir Kaganski’s analysis, Russia herself is an example of unformed space, which needs to be reassembled. Though in a different sense, the EU is far from being based upon a well established spatial structure of governance. Therefore, one may wonder whether the two entities in transition are in a position to constitute a durable set of spatial arrangements. One of possible ways of conceptualizing this intricacy could be found in Jean Baudrillard’s supposition that in a situation of post-modernity, “map could take precedence of territory”984. In the context of our analysis one may reinterpret this statement in the following way: the function of the “road maps” is not that much to reflect or to fix a certain state of bilateral arrangements, but rather to incite the process of integration, and therefore to institute and incite the new integrative drive.

Yet, presumably, the Four Spaces inter-subjective perspective could have been analyzed in a different way – namely, as a situation of “inter-passivity”, a term coined by Slavoj Zizek. To certain extent, Russia yielded the political initiative to the EU, and in response received an alternative project with the Four Spaces at its core. The EU, from its part, made a proposal without clarifying its content, thus leaving further moves to Russia. Therefore, the Four Spaces symbolize both Russia’s subjection/subordination to the outside power and some degree of resistance to it.

Каталог: old -> Departments -> International relations
International relations -> Материалы для чтения
International relations -> Материалы для чтения the four freedoms as part of europeanization process: conditions and effectiveness of the eu impact
Departments -> Учебная программа дисциплина: Физическая культура Направления подготовки: 031300. 62 031600. 62
Departments -> Учебно-методический комплекс по дисциплине " финансы и кредит" Нижний Новгород 2004 Печатается по решению редакционно-издательского совета гоу нглу им. Н. А. Добролюбова
International relations -> Материалы для чтения
International relations -> Материалы для чтения
1   ...   30   31   32   33   34   35   36   37   ...   83

  • Discursive Strategy 2
  • From Neighbourhood to Spatiality