Материалы для чтения the four freedoms as part of europeanization process: conditions and effectiveness of the eu impact

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Материалы для чтения the four freedoms as part of europeanization process: conditions and effectiveness of the eu impact



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Сила «маргинальности»?


Margin” – это тот термин, концептуализации которого в настоящее время уделяется особое внимание. Идею Н.Паркера о том, что окраины являются не только «продуктами» держав-лидеров, но и сами способны воздействовать на эти державы, развили Кристофер Браунинг и Пертти Йонниеми. С одной стороны, окраинные территории могут способствовать снижению значимости границ (de-bordering) и, соответственно, «пост-модернизации» политического пространства. В частности, основы такого подхода содержатся в финской концепции «Северного измерения», которая видит в окраинах «посредников», «контактные пространства» (что наглядно просматривается на примере финско-российской границы). С другой стороны, окраинные территории могут содействовать укреплению границ (bordering) и в этом смысле – поддерживать те принципы национальной исключительности и суверенитета, которые заложены в вестфальской системе523. Скорее всего, К.Браунинг и П.Йоннимеми имели в виду калининградскую проблему.

В контексте нашего анализа особенно важной представляется идея о возрастающей значимости окраин («маргинальных» территорий) в Европе. Связано это с несколькими обстоятельствами. Во-первых, глобализация может снижать значимость географического фактора для центральных держав, но для периферийных территорий эта значимость не падает, а то и возрастает524. «Новый регионализм», таким образом, можно трактовать как инструмент, с помощью которого ряд окраинных стран, географически удалённых от центров принятия решений (например, Финляндия, Норвегия, Польша), избегает потенциального превращения в социально-культурную и политическую периферию525. Мало кто в Европе хочет быть периферийной страной, если под границей понимать разделительную линию, чреватую в лучшем случае неопределённостью, а в худшем - потенциальными конфликтами; в то же время существует явное стремление ряда стран использовать своё «стыковочное» положение для извлечения тех или иных выгод, что часто выражается в метафоре «моста», соединяющего партнёров друг с другом.



Во-вторых, региональные пространства, формирующиеся у западных границ России, вносят существенный вклад в подготовку Европы к самым различным "сценариям", которые в ближайшее время могут быть реализованы:

  • в том случае, если вектор мировой политики будет направлен в сторону создания транснациональных регионов (с последующей конкуренцией между ними), то давняя формула "Европа регионов" будет воплощена в жизнь в виде Балтийского и Нордического регионов, прообразы которых уже существуют;

  • при тенденции к усилению международно-политических позиций ЕС региональные инициативы типа "Северного измерения" будут реализовываться как программы Европейского Союза, к чему есть все формальные предпосылки;

  • если у ЕС возникнет потребность оказания давления на Россию по тому или иному поводу, то это может быть сделано в рамках «Восточного измерения»;

  • европейские трансрегиональные структуры также потенциально готовы инкорпорировать те территории России, которые в будущем могут пожелать более настойчиво дистанцироваться от Москвы. По крайней мере, в отношении них будет проводиться политика "открытых дверей", очерчивающая привлекательную альтернативу;

  • в рамках анализируемых проектов регионостроительства "окультурено" пространство для сетевого участия в нём негосударственных (sovereignty-free) акторов, от городов (концепции "новой Ганзы" и "треугольников роста") до некоммерческих организаций (экологических, правозащитных,и пр.).



Выводы для России


Расширение зоны ЕС автоматически не только смещает внешние границы Евросоюза, но и делает их более протяженными и, в известном смысле, более проблемными. В основном, это касается зон непосредственного соприкосновения новых членов ЕС с Россией, Украиной и Беларусью (в этом контексте название «Без границ», выбранное для специализированного польского журнала, освещающего проблемы европейской интеграции, кажется не совсем удачным).

Что сказанное означает для России? Взаимодействуя с Европой в различных её проявлениях, РФ часто соприкасается с региональными пространствами, сконструированными в значительной степени для амортизации возможных трений между «своими» и «чужими», «нами» и «ими». С другой стороны, эти региональные пространства выполняют важную роль «зондов», с помощью которых Европа проверяет серьёзность наших намерений и их обеспеченность не только политической волей, но и ресурсами. Для России эти региональные пространства – неизбежные зоны соприкосновения с Европой, игнорировать или миновать которые невозможно, да и не нужно, поскольку в каждом из них скрыт значительный – и далеко не полностью использованный – потенциал.

Россия, не имея в ближайшем будущем реальных шансов стать частью “Большой Европы”, тем не менее, может позволить себе альтернативу - участие в строительстве европейских трансграничных пространств. Они пока находятся лишь в самой начальной стадии своего формирования (что соответствует англоязычному понятию region-in-the-making), в силу чего Россия имеет шанс повлиять на этот процесс, поскольку он развивается одновременно в нескольких плоскостях, в том числе и в сфере публичных дебатов, конференций, неформального обмена мнениями. Это – те сферы, где никто не может претендовать на интеллектуальную гегемонию; однако, к сожалению, именно там, где открываются реальные возможности сделать российскую позицию частью широкого обсуждения, голосов из России почти не слышны.

Российским политическим кругам следует осознать то обстоятельство (кстати, давно осмысленное политическими экспертами, в том числе и российскими), что её место в Европе будет зависеть от способности к интеграции, а не от военного потенциала, могущего быть использованным за пределами страны. Кроме того, России давно пора свыкнуться с тем, что все её западные соседи находятся на стадии усиления своего влияния в европейской политике. Можно полностью согласиться с Дмитрием Трениным в том, что у России есть шанс стать частью "Большой Европы", но при условии долгосрочных усилий на основе осознанной стратегии "креативного приспособления". В рамках этой стратегии важнейшую роль должен сыграть сам факт участия как России в целом, так и её отдельных акторов, в формировании того, что можно назвать "потоками", определяющими контуры новых, пока ещё слабо освоенных "пространств", конструируемых социально и интеллектуально.

Россия двояко реагирует на вызовы «нового регионализма». Внутри страны эта реакция проявляется в попытках перегруппировать сложившийся территориальный порядок (сюда можно отнести и создание федеральных округов, и дискуссии об укрупнении субъектов федерации, и предсказанную Центром стратегических исследований Приволжского федерального округа тенденцию к переходу от «административных» к «культурно-экономическим» регионам). Одновременно Россия пытается модифицировать свою систему внешних коммуникаций, особенно во взаимоотношениях с европейскими партнёрами. Понятно, что в силу географических причин РФ слишком велика, чтобы полностью интегрироваться в любую из трансрегиональных организаций, формирующихся вблизи её границ. Но и оставаться в стороне Россия тоже не может. Следовательно, остаётся один стратегический вариант – постепенно, шаг за шагом сближаться с интересующими нас трансрегиональными структурами и «строить Европу внутри России». Но такой сценарий предполагает наличие у субнациональных властей нашей страны больших полномочий в принятии решений. Пока дипломатия часто, к сожалению, оказывается нечувствительной по отношению к субнациональным интересам, а поэтому не в состоянии ни отразить, ни сформулировать, ни тем более защитить особые позиции отдельных региональных субъектов в процессах современной трансрегиональной интеграции. Поскольку несколько субъектов РФ имеют прямое касательство к процессам, протекающим в зоне непосредственного соприкосновения с европейской интеграцией, это выдвигает в число приоритетных задач нахождение такого механизма, который адекватно отражал бы их запросы и потребности.


THEORIZING BORDERS
David Newman
Department of Politics and Government,

Ben Gurion University of the Negev,

Beer Sheva, Israel 84105.

Email: newman@bgumail.bgu.ac.il



NICOSIA What Costas Constantinou wanted most, when the border between north and south Cyprus opened, was to find the missing part of his street.

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He had grown up on Aesculapius Street, once a place of elegant mansions with carved doorways and Venetian wrought-iron balconies. One day in 1974, when he was a small child, his street was cut in half by a military barricade and a strip of no-man's-land.


Since then, the mansions have crumbled, but the wall is intact, dividing the capital. Almost 190 kilometers (about 120 miles) long, the no-man's-land cuts across this entire Mediterranean island under the vigilant eye of UN peacekeepers. Its brutal message, that Greeks and Turks would kill each other without a physical barrier, has shaped the memories of an entire generation of Cypriots.

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On Aesculapius Street, the divide looks nothing like the Berlin Wall's forbidding expanse, but more like the work of a malevolent folk artist, with its concrete base, stacks of oil drums and car tires, and a crown of barbed wire topped by a Greek flag. Behind it, a strip of silent no-man's-land ends in a Turkish wall.



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But the barrier blocking his view, and his passage, also made him yearn for the other side. For years he fantasized, he said, drawing maps and imagining the rest of his street, with houses and children.

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Two weeks ago, when the Turkish Cypriot leaders abruptly eased border crossings, Constantinou got on his motorbike. In the first rush, 300,000 people, about one-third of the island's population, have since passed the checkpoints. The Greek Cypriots are going north and the Turkish Cypriots south, all brushing aside the years of bitter, separatist talk.


There was no map to guide him, and, anyway, all the streets now had Turkish names…. Then he suddenly found his street ….. Constantinou's missing street and neighborhood were not intact, with many houses gone or riddled with shell holes. Like his part of the street, it ended in a wall, covered with corrugated iron sheets and a sign saying "forbidden zone" in four languages.

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Constantinou says he is pleased he found the missing half of the puzzle in his mind. He knows at last how his street, his neighborhood, connects to the other side. "Of course, it's still haunting," he said. "The no-go zone and the barriers still exist. It drove some people crazy. Maybe my mind will come to rest once I can walk down my street."


New York Times, May 9th 2003.

Border studies have come a long way during the past decade. From the study of the hard territorial line separating states within the international system, the contemporary study of borders focuses on the process of bordering, through which territories and peoples are respectively included or excluded within a hierarchical network of groups, affiliations and identities (Welchman, 1996; Newman & Paasi, 1998; Newman, 2000; 2002a; Kolossov & O'Loughlin, 199X; Van Houtum, 2000). The lines which are borders are as flexible as they were once thought to be rigid, reflecting new territorial and aspatial patterns of human behaviour. While modern technologies, particularly cyberspace, has made the barrier role of borders redundant in some areas, they have also served to create new sets of borders and boundaries, enclosing groups with common identities and interests who are dispersed throughout the globe, lacking any form of territorial compactness or contiguity.


This paper raises the question whether it is possible to develop a theory of bordering which will encompass the diverse types of border and boundary experience. Given the diverse nature of border / boundary studies, I have previously argued that the only way to create a common language between the different disciplinary languages (including geographers, political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, economists and others) is to create a common set of theoretical constructs and frameworks which can be used as a generalized explanatory model as a means of understanding the changing border / boundary phenomenon (Newman, 2003). In essence, this paper reiterates a question asked long ago in one of the classic studies of international boundaries, namely how do we redefine the concept of boundary (border) in the settings of contemporary time and place (Jones, 1959).
Others have argued that any such attempt to create a single analytical framework is doomed to failure. The study of borders is so diverse, both in terms of the geographic and spatial scales (ranging from the global to the local, and from the State to the urban neighbourhood) and in terms of the type of borders being discussed (from the hard geographic, to the social and cultural, and from the concrete visible boundaries to the perceived and imagined) that it would not be possible to create a single set of explanatory variables. Instead, they argue, the multi-disciplinary nature of boundary studies should be encouraged as a means of bringing theoreticians and practitioners from a range of disciplines together, exchanging ideas, complementing each others understanding of the boundary phenomenon, and broadening the horizons for future research and practice.
State borders remain the distinct category, inasmuch as they have constituted the focus of border studies in the past and inasmuch as they retain the major element of power relations and State sovereignty (Waterman, 1994; Dittgen, 2000). The permeability and elasticity of borders has increased significantly during the past decade, but the world has not become borderless. The territorial line separating one state from its neighbour remains one of the basic constructs of whatever sovereignty is left in the modern State system.


Borders as Institutions
Part of the transformation in border studies has been the recognition that borders are institutions, as contrasted to simply lines in the sand or on the map. Like all institutions they have their own set of internal rules which govern their behaviour, much of which becomes self-perpetuating and subject to inertia to change. Border institutions govern the extent of inclusion and exclusion, the degree of permeability, the laws governing trans-boundary movement – exit from one side of the border and entry into the other side. At this level of understanding, border institutions are not dissimilar despite the diverse type of borders, ranging in scale and type, in existence (Oomen, 1995; Sibley, 1995).
The essence of a border is to separate the "self" from the "other". As such, one of the major functions of a border is to act as a barrier, "protecting" the "us insiders" from the "them outsiders". They prevent the entry of undesired elements – be they people, goods, arms, drugs and – albeit to a much lesser extent than in the past – information. The determination of just what can and cannot move beyond the border is a function of how the power elites of a given society or country view the border as an institutions which protects those who are included from the negative impact of those who have been excluded. The protection function takes on many forms – at the primordial level protecting the citizens of a country from invasion by foreign armies or from the inflow of illegal weapons across the border. The barrier function of borders also protects those inside from other "harmful" elements, such as drugs, migrant labour, competition in the market place and so on. Cultural borders offer protection against infiltration of values which are not compatible with the hegemonic practices of the majority, be they social and economic status, religious affiliation and / or residential homogeneity.
But borders are equally there to be crossed. From the moment they are established, there are always groups who have an interest in finding ways to move beyond the barrier. They may be seeking jobs, visiting family and friends from whom they have been cut off, smuggling goods, drugs or weapons. But crossing the border does not always bring the expected benefits. The grass is not always greener on the other side especially when one doesn’t have the necessary documents, work permits, language proficiency, or is captured by the authorities in a round up of illegal immigrants. Every year, thousands of Mexicans try to cross the barbed wire fence that separates their country from the US to find work. Dozens die in the region’s mountains, rivers and deserts in the attempt. The social impact is very heavy. Many communities in Mexico are stripped of able-bodied men and the burden of taking care of children and family is placed on the women and the elderly.
There are an estimated 4.5 million Mexicans residing illegally in the US. In Arizona, the US Border Patrol arrest up to 50,000 migrants from Mexico a month. Crossing the physical border from the third into the first world may only serve to transform someone who was a cultural insider into an outsider, a status for which no amount of economic self improvement can compensate (Martinez, 1994a; Johnson, 1994; Alvarez, 1995).
Institutions change in one of two ways. Either the rules and regulations governing their behaviour are changed by those groups who make policy decisions. Institutions can have built-in adaptive mechanisms such as internal auditing. Or, there is grass roots change from below which challenges the continued existence of the functional norms of the institution. Since institutions are self perpetuating and resistant to change, it often requires an increase in levels of trans-boundary interaction on the ground for the norms and regulations to undergo any formal process of change. Most border studies have focused on the government imposed status of the border and its associated management mechanisms. This is partly because of the control function which is attributed to state territoriality, a function which can only be implemented through government practices when there are clearly defined borders which determine the parameters within which policies of control are shaped (Taylor, 1994; Hakli, 2001). The "end of territorial absolutism" means an end to the absolute control exercised by the State through practices of fixed territoriality. Thus governments are reluctant to relinquish control of the borders unless there is pressure from outside (globalization) or from below (localization). To study borders as dynamic institutions, it is therefore important to study the "bottom up" process of change, that which emanates from the daily functional patterns of the people living in the borderland region, as much as the traditional "top down" approach which focuses solely on the role of government.
The Bordering Process
It is the process of bordering, rather than the border line per se, that has universal significance in the ordering of society. All borders share a common function to the extent that they include some and exclude many others. This is as true of the hard territorial line which determines the shape and size of the territorial compartments within which people play out their daily lives, as it is the social, religious, cultural, ethnic and cyber boundaries which reflect the groups to which people belong and affiliate and, for many, determine their various identities (Leimgruber, 1991; Morley & Robbins, 1995; Shapiro & Alker, 1996; Paasi, 1996a; 1996b; Wilson & Donnan, 1998). With the exception of territorial compartmentalization, the bordering process does not have to create inclusion or exclusion contiguities. Belonging to virtual groups and cyber affiliations expresses a global pattern of inclusion, whose boundaries are neither visible or contiguous, but exist by virtue of the nature of belonging to a common interest group, sharing specific values, social status and identities.
Border studies of the past decade have taught us that through the establishment of borders we create difference. The existence of borders enables us to maintain some sort of order, both within the spaces and groups which are thus encompassed, as well as between "our" compartment and that of the "other" groups and spaces which are part of a broader system of global ordering (Albert et al, 2001; van Houtum & Naerssen, 2002). Territorial borders performed precisely this function under the Westphalian state system, where the principle of Uti Possidetis ensured the maintenance of inter-state order through the mutual respect of territorial integrity and, hence, the notion of territorial sovereignty (Anderson, 1996; Castellino & Allen, 2003). The process of territorial ordering was imposed upon the political landscape by the power elites of the time, just as it was dung the decolonization period, and just as it is today by those who groups who determine the values and codes which enable some to be members, while others have to remain outside. Thus the bordering process creates order through the construction of difference, whereby "others" are expected to respect the rights of the self, if only because they desire their own rights to be respected in the same way, or because the nature of power relations is such that they have no alternative. The Groucho Marx notion of borders, namely that we do not desire to belong to groups which don't want us as members in the first place, is the exception rather than the rule. Most of us aspire to cross borders into the forbidden, and often invisible, spaces on the other side of the wall, although at one and the same time we do not want the "others" to cross the boundaries into our own recognizable and familiar world. Difference is okay if we determine the rules of belonging. It is unacceptable, if it is determined by someone else.
By creating "otherness", we create separate identities, maintaining these identities – be they social, national, ethnic or economic – through the maintenance of the border which separates one identity group from the other. The location of the boundary may change through time, as some groups or territories expand and others decline, but they will always demarcate the parameters within which identities are conceived, perceived and perpetuated. It is a two way process, with existing identities instrumental in the creation of their own borders, while existing borders determine the extent and dispersion of those belonging to a specific identity group.
Whatever the form of reterritorialization which takes place, territory remains an important dimension of identity (Forsberg, 1996; Kaplan, 1999). The loss of sovereignty does not mean the loss of territoriality – regionalization at both the pan-State and intra-state levels takes on new forms of territorial organization of power and, by association, new forms and contours of the borders encompassing these spaces (Agnew, 1994; Brenner, 1999). Territorial restructuring is constantly taking place as new power containers take the place of the state. Space and, by association, borders undergo constant reification (Kemp, 2000; Forsberg, 2003). Governments attempt to create new overlaps between discrete political and national or ethnic boundaries, but the greater elasticity and flexibility of contemporary borders makes this even more difficult to socially construct than it ever was in the past. Neither should we forget that the hard territorial lines of inter-state boundaries still engender a great deal of conflict, although much of this conflict is focused as much on issues of identity and historical construction of "homeland" spaces, as it is on positional and resource disputes (Dzurek1999; Newman, 2004).

A recent Belgian film, entitled "the Wall" demonstrates, somewhat absurdly, the bordering process and the way in which barriers can be created to reflect existing differences and socially constructed territorial identities, creating walls, barriers, division and conflict where a single functional space existed. The hero of the film is a French speaking owner of a fried potato wagon. The non-existent line dividing the French and Flemish speaking areas of the city go directly through his wagon. He resides in the French speaking section of the city but remains for a Millenium eve party on the Flemish side. When he wakes up in the morning, it is to find that a concrete barrier of Berlin wall proportions has been constructed through the heart of the city and has divided his wagon into two parts. He is unable to return to his home on the other side of the wall because he does not have a visa or the necessary documents. French speakers without documents are sought out by a neo-Nazi style police force who attempt to arrest him, but he manages to escape and, with his Flemish speaking girlfriend, to cross (somewhat mysteriously and miraculously) into his own side of the city. But his sigh of relief lasts for no more than few moments when his girlfriend now finds herself subject to the same dangers and problems on the French side of the wall that he was subject to on the Flemish side. In the film, linguistic difference is socially constructed into political belonging, through which each excludes the other, despite the fact that normal patterns of daily behaviour and interaction (such as Flemish and French speakers eating and gossiping in the chip wagon) had taken place with few problems. This is in direct contrast to the notion of "nationalism without walls" (Gwyn, 1995) where, it is argued, difference exists in spite of borders. This is a problematic notion, relating to the permeability, rather than actual existence, of the border. Nationalism is contingent upon borders, although whether those borders enable movement and interaction with the "other" is a different question altogether.



Thus borders are sometimes imposed from the outside and sometimes from the inside. Minorities are often as keen to prevent the majority from “coming in”, as majorities desire to prevent the minority from “breaking out”. This is as true of the State, as it is of ethnic and ghetto neighbourhoods, as it is of the personal spaces and borders which are perceived and created around the individual. To understand the bordering process which groups and nations place around themselves, we need to have a better understanding of the personal borders which individuals create in their search for private spaces, some of which are just as exclusive as those which are created by governments and States. Research into the bordering process is an inclusive one – it includes this diversity of scale and border types, from the global to the local and the personal, as well as from the hard territorial lines to the perceived and elastic zones of contact / separation.
Multidisciplinarity and the Search for a Common Language in the Study of Borders
For as long as the study of boundaries was synonymous with the lines separating the sovereign territory of states in the international system, the focus of research was geographical. As our understanding of boundaries has taken on new forms and scales of analysis, so too the study of the bordering phenomenon has become multi-disciplinary, with sociologists, political scientists, historians, international lawyers and anthropologists taking an active part in the expanding discourse. Increasingly, seminars and conferences organized by such institutions as the International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) at the University of Durham in England, the Association of Borderland Studies (ABS) in the USA, and the Border Regions in Transition (BRIT) conferences have taken on an added multi-disciplinary dimension, enabling border narratives and experiences to be shared within a common transition zone.
But like many multi-disciplinary discourses, the language, semantics and meanings of the border have experienced difficulties in fusing into a single set of recognizable parameters and concepts. Crossing the language barrier of the borders between academic disciplines and practitioners is often harder than the trans-boundary movement which is increasingly taking place across the borders between states and regions (Becher, 1989; Bourdieu, 1991; Newman, 1999). In this sense, academic compartments provide an appropriate metaphor for our understanding of the bordering process, the way in which some are included and most are excluded. Crossing from one compartment into another requires the appropriate credentials in terms of documentation, qualifications and semantics. The existing institutional structure displays a high level of inertia to boundary crossings from one discipline to another, while scholars who attempt to straddle the border on both sides are, more often than not, accused of shallowness and of not belonging fully to either disciplinary compartment. The managers and gatekeepers of the academic border institutions – the journal editors, the funding agencies and the promotion committees – essentially perpetuate difference, with linguistic and semantic exclusivity constituting one of the most powerful weapons at their disposal.
It is the postmodern discourse within the social science which has began to challenge the hegemony of rigid academic compartmentalization. It befits scholars of borders from all disciplines to be in the forefront of academic trans-boundary interaction and discourse. To achieve that, we need to know more about the multi-cultural definitions of basic terminologies which, until recently, has only ever been understood within our own enclosed and compartmentalized paradigms. What, for instance do the terms "border", "boundary", "frontier", borderland", "transition zone" mean to geographers, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, economists and historians? We need to create a common dictionary, to share common terms, so that when we meet to discuss borders, spaces and territories, we at least know what the other is talking about. Our mutual understanding of the institutions which are borders can only benefit from such a pooling of our semantic exclusivity.


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